Revealing 21% of GDP in Hidden Assets: Evidence from Argentina’s Tax Amnesty

The paper studies the effectiveness of tax amnesties and their impacts on capital taxation and public spending. We leverage rich policy variation from Argentina, which implemented the world’s most successful program, reportedly revealing assets worth 21% of GDP. First, despite substantial offshore tax evasion, declared foreign assets quadrupled. Second, tax progressivity improved because disclosures were extensive among the wealthiest 0.1%. Third, improving tax compliance has sizable fiscal externalities on capital taxes and social transfers: the wealth and capital income tax bases more than doubled, and the earmarked revenue boosted pension benefits by 15%. We end by discussing the lessons from Argentina.

A Modern Excess Profit Tax

This paper presents a new way to tax excess profits. We propose to tax the rise in the stock market capitalization of companies that benefit from extraordinary circumstances, such as energy firms following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Targeting the rise in stock market capitalization (which is easily observable) makes the tax much harder to avoid than standard excess profit taxes, and allows to capture rents irrespective of where multinational companies book their profits. We apply this proposal to energy companies that are headquartered or have sales in the European Union. We estimate that taxing the January 2022 to September 2022 valuation gains of energy firms at a rate of 33% would generate around €80 billion in revenue (0.4% of GDP) for the European Union. We discuss implementation practicalities and compare our proposals to other plans made to tax excess profits.

Will We Ever Be Able to Track Offshore Wealth? Evidence from the Offshore Real Estate Market in the UK

This paper provides evidence of the growing importance of real estate assets in offshore portfolios. We study the implementation of the first multilateral automatic exchange of information norm, the Common Reporting Standard (CRS), which introduces cross-border reporting requirements for financial assets but not for real estate assets. Exploiting administrative data on property purchases made by foreign companies in the UK, we show that the implementation of the CRS led to a significant increase of real estate investments from companies incorporated in the tax havens that were the most exposed to the policy. We confirm that this increase comes from company owners of countries committing to the new standard by identifying the residence country of a sub-sample of buyers using the Panama Papers and other leaked datasets. We estimate that between £16 and £19 billion have been invested in the UK real estate market between 2013 and 2016 in reaction to the CRS, suggesting that at the global scale between 24% and 27% of the money that fled tax havens following this policy were ultimately invested in properties.

Did the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Reduce Profit Shifting by US Multinational Companies?

The 2017 Tax Cut and Jobs Act reduced the US corporate tax rate and introduced provisions to curb profit shifting. We combine survey data, tax data, and firm financial statements to study the evolution of the geographical allocation of US firms’ profits after the reform. The share of profits booked abroad by US multinationals fell 3–5 percentage points, driven by repatriations of intellectual property to the US. The share of foreign profits booked in tax havens remained stable around 50% between 2015 and 2020. Changes in the global allocation of profits are small overall, but some firms responded strongly.

Tax Planning by European Banks

This paper explores profit shifting behaviour by European banks through a newly available data source. Financial institutions as of 2014 started disclosing their activity on a country-by-country level following the CRDIV EU Directive. The country-by-country reporting (CbCR) requires European banks to file their revenues, profits, number of employees and taxes paid in all countries where they operate including tax haven countries. In this paper, I construct the database for bank CbCR from the banks filings and annual reports. The database includes 51 European banks headquartered in 18 different European countries between 2014 and 2020. I use the database to study profit shifting arising from international tax differences between countries. I find that the banks’ profits are sensitive to the tax rate suggesting that banks lower their tax burden through their affiliates. The size of banks seems to have an effect, the larger the bank group, the more it might engage in tax planning. Profit shifting is estimated by using the tax differential methodology. The findings show that profit shifting by the top European banks is around 4-3% percent of the total profits booked abroad. This implies tax revenue losses of up to 3-2%. The introduction of a global minimum tax of 15% would generate between 300 to 2 billion euros depending on the final rules implemented.

Who Owns Offshore Real Estate? Evidence from Dubai

We use novel leaked microdata to study offshore real estate in Dubai, a fast-growing tax haven. We find that the non-resident ownership share of residential real estate grew from nearly zero in 2005 to 30% ($68 billion) in 2019, a share much larger than other large global cities. We then go on to show that offshore real estate displays a strong gravity relationship and is more frequently owned at the upper end of the wealth distribution. Finally, we document that both tax evasion (with an 80% evasion rate) and sanctions driven capital flight are important motives for owning offshore real estate.