The Cadbury Schweppes judgment and its implications on profit shifting activities within Europe
Research article by Sabine Schenkelberg 2019
Summary
To prevent their home multinational enterprises (MNEs) from shifting their profits to low-tax jurisdictions, many headquarter countries introduced Controlled-Foreign-Company (CFC) rules. Based on variable conditions, these rules generally impose that the low-taxed earnings of affected MNEs’ foreign affiliates be taxed at the tax rate of the parent company’s country. While prior research has underlined the effectiveness of these rules in curbing income shifting, in 2006, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decided with the Cadbury-Schweppes judgment that CFC rules infringe the European principle of freedom of establishment. Their applicability was restricted to wholly artificial arrangements, i.e. pure letter boxes. In this article, Schenkelberg questions whether this weakening of CFC rules facilitated profit shifting for European MNEs.
Schenkelberg evaluates the impact of the judgement on MNE subsidiaries in low-tax countries by comparing the evolution of reported profits for affiliates owned by European MNEs and those by American MNEs. The latter are chosen as a control group because they are not subject to European CFC rules and the judgement should therefore not affect them. She finds that in the wake of the Cadbury-Schweppes judgement, European-owned subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions increased their pre-tax earnings by around 10%, in comparison to the control group. Pre-tax earnings of affected subsidiaries rise even more sharply when the subsidiary is located in a very low-tax country, when the subsidiary is owned by a country with a tax rate above 25%, or when the MNE receives mobile income such as interests, licenses, and royalties. Her results further suggest that 85% of the increased profit shifting activities are related to transfer pricing and less than 15% are related to debt shifting.
Key results
- The Cadbury-Schweppes judgement has weakened the effectiveness of European CFC regulations.
- In the wake of the Cadbury-Schweppes judgement, the pre-tax earnings of the affiliates of MNEs affected by CFC rules in low-tax jurisdictions have increased by 10% relative to that of US-owned subsidiaries.
- The effect was stronger, the lower the statutory corporate income tax rate of the affiliate’s country and the higher the tax rate of the MNE’s headquarter country.
- MNEs with mobile income, such as interests, licenses, or royalties reacted more strongly to the judgement.
- On average, more than 85% of the increased profit shifting activities are related to transfer pricing and less than 15% are related to debt shifting.